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The Problem of Nomological Impossibility for Epistemic
Structural Realism
By Patrick Manzanares
Department of Philosophy
patrick.manzanares@wmich.edu
I. Introduction
In his article “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, John Worrall introduces
the concept of ‘structure’ in order to defend a version of Scientific Realism that respects
historical considerations of ontological discontinuity between successive scientific theories.
Worrall argues that despite the fact that there is no ontological continuity between successive
scientific theories in general, successor theories do preserve the formal structure of earlier
theories. The formal structure of an earlier theory is usually preserved as a “limiting case” of
the successor theory’s structure: the earlier structure can be recovered from the successor
structure by allowing some quantity in the latter to tend towards some limit (Worrall 1989,
120).
This retention of formal structure between successive theories, according to Worrall,
underlies the cumulative nature of science. This cumulative nature, in turn, provides reason to
believe that the formal structures of current scientific theories are (approximately) accurate.
If formal structure is in fact preserved between successive theories, then only the accuracy of
the relevant formal structures can adequately explain the empirical success of science.
Despite the potential loss of ontology between theories, then, the Scientific Realist is justified
in believing in the approximate accuracy of the structures of current scientific theories.
The fact that most cases of structure retention involve limiting cases, however, presents a
problem for Worrall’s account. It seems that some earlier theories can only be recovered
from successor theories as nomologically impossible idealizations of the latter, since this
recovery involves allowing some quantity in the formal structure of the successor theory to
tend towards some physically unrealizable limit. But if this is the case, then the earlier theory
cannot be physically realized either. It is thus unclear in what sense the structure of the earlier
theory can be said to accurately represent the physical structure of the world, since the former
is nomologically impossible while the latter is actual (ex hypothesi). If the nomological
impossibility of the earlier theory’s structure undermines the Scientific Realist’s justification
for believing in it, moreover, then the preservation of structure through theory change will fail
to secure justification for the belief in the accuracy of the successor theory’s formal structure.
The Scientific Realist will thus be left with no reason to believe in the structural accuracy of
current scientific theories.
II. Epistemic Structural Realism
Worrall introduces the position of Epistemic Structural Realism in order to accommodate
Scientific Realist intuitions about the empirical success of science as a whole while
addressing concerns about theory change. Worrall notes that the main argument in favor of
Scientific Realism is the so-called “No Miracles” Argument: the only adequate explanation of
the empirical success of science is the claim that mature sciences are approximately true; we
should therefore believe in the approximate truth of the mature i sciences (Worrall 1989, 100).
This argument for the Scientific Realist position, Worrall notes, relies on the claim that
the succession of scientific theories has historically been “essentially cumulative” (Worrall
1989, 105). Some elements of the supplanted (yet mature) theory, in addition to its successful
(observational) empirical consequences, must be preserved to some degree by the successor
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(and also mature) theory in order for the two successive theories to exhibit a robust form of
continuity between them. It is in virtue of this type of continuity that the Scientific Realist
can be justified in advancing the “No Miracles” Argument. Once the continuity has been
established, the Scientific Realist can infer by induction that any future succession of
scientific theories will also be essentially cumulative. All earlier mature theories will thus be
viewed as approximately correct from the standpoint of later theories by virtue of this
continuity. This approximate correctness, in turn, will serve as the only adequate explanation
of their empirical success and must therefore be accepted.
The crucial claim that science is essentially cumulative faces a forceful historical
objection, however. This objection is expressed by the Pessimistic Meta-Induction Argument,
which denies the robust continuity between scientific theories to which the Scientific Realist
appeals. According to this argument, the history of science includes many examples of
mature and empirically successful theories that were once believed to be approximately true
but are now considered thoroughly false from the perspective of current mature and successful
theories. This suggests science is not essentially cumulative, as there have been mature and
successful theories once thought to be approximately correct that have not been preserved to
any degree by contemporary theories. But if successive scientific theories do not exhibit the
requisite continuity, the Scientific Realist cannot appeal to the approximate truth of theories
(both supplanted and successors) in order to explain the empirical success of science as a
whole.
Worrall believes the Scientific Realist should concede the fact that science is not
essentially cumulative with respect to theoretical posits (Worrall 1989, 109). Despite
preserving the successful empirical consequences of its predecessor, a successor scientific
theory rarely (if ever) retains the complete theoretical ontology of this predecessor.
Nevertheless, Worrall claims there is robust continuity of formal structure between successive
theories (Worrall 1989, 120). The mathematical equations ii describing the relations between
the theoretical posits of a supplanted theory are preserved to a large extent by the
corresponding successor theory. This suggests that the Scientific Realist need not commit to
the continuity of ontology between successive theories as the crucial factor underlying the
cumulative nature of science. The Scientific Realist can account for the empirical success of
scientific theories by appealing to the retention of formal structure between successive
theories, which indicates that the Scientific Realist can be justified in believing the accuracy
of these formal structures in approximating the actual physical structure of the world. This
Realist epistemic attitude towards the formal structures of mature and empirically successful
scientific theories constitutes the core of Worrall’s Epistemic Structural Realism.
III. An Objection
Christopher Pincock (2011) raises a worry for the Epistemic Structural Realist
concerning the accuracy of an empirically successful theory’s structure. The empirical
success of a scientific theory, Pincock claims, does not guarantee that the structure of the
theory is an exact representation of the structure characterizing the relevant physical
phenomenon being studied.
Pincock argues that the formal structure of an empirically successful scientific theory
might fail to accurately represent the physical structure of the world (or of some relevant subdomain of the world) in one of two ways: the relevant theory might contain too much
structure, or it might contain too little (Pincock 2011, 74). In the first case, the mathematics
of a theory might be more complex than what is in fact needed to describe the relations
obtaining among the entities of a particular physical system. iii The theory containing this
overly complex mathematical structure could still be empirically successful, since it would
contain the necessary resources to generate accurate predictions. Nevertheless, the structure
of such a theory would not be faithful to the physical structure of the world.
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The structure of a theory can also fail to capture the entire structure of the physical
system it studies. It might be the case that the formal structure of such a theory does not take
into account certain parameters whose effects, while being exemplified or instantiated in the
physical system under consideration, are not noticeable enough at the scale under
consideration to sufficiently affect the empirical adequacy of the theory at this scale. iv The
structure of the scientific theory would thus seem to accurately represent the structure of the
physical system being studied, but only because certain ranges of initial and boundary
conditions (corresponding to smaller and larger scales of the physical system) are not taken
into account.
If the formal structure of a theory fails to have the exact amount of structure, Pincock,
argues, “there is no reason to think that the structures appealed to will survive theoretical
change” (Pincock 2011, 75). This would then rob the Epistemic Structural Realist of a key
premise in the relevant formulation of the “No Miracles” Argument: the claim that science is
essentially cumulative with respect to formal structure.
IV. Limiting Cases
Pincock notes, however, that an Epistemic Structural Realist can at this point appeal to
the limiting relation that is supposed to obtain between mature successive scientific theories in
order to rescue the notion of structural continuity between theories (Pincock 2011, 75-76).
The Epistemic Structural Realist can grant the fact that structure is rarely carried over intact
from an earlier theory to a successor theory. Even when mature scientific theories do not
contain the correct amount of structure (they contain too much or too little), successor theories
can add needed structure or subtract excess structure without violating structural continuity
between theories. This can be accomplished by ensuring that the formal structure of an earlier
theory is preserved as a limiting case of the successor theory’s structure (Worrall 1989, 120).
In his (1981), Larry Laudan provides a straightforward description of the limiting case
relation that the Epistemic Structural Realist claims obtains between successive theories. If
an earlier theory T1 is a limiting case of a successor theory T 2, then (1) the variables
representing both observational and theoretical terms that are assigned a value in T 1 form a
subset of the set of variables that are assigned a value of T 2, and (2) the values that T 2 assigns
to the variables in this subset are sufficiently close to the values that T 1 assigned to the
variables in that subset, provided certain initial and boundary conditions are met (Laudan
1981, 39).
Laudan argues that this characterization of the limiting case relation commits the
Scientific Realist to the perfect preservation of ontology (including theoretical posits)
whenever T1 is succeeded by T2, if T1 is to count as a limiting case of T 2 (Laudan 1981, 40).
But notice that the Epistemic Structural Realist need not commit to such a strong claim.
While granting the above description of what the limiting case relation between two
successive theories is, it will be enough for T 2 to preserve the relations between the variables
assigned a value by T1 in order for T1 to count as a limiting relation of T 2. In preserving the
relations between the variables of T 1 described by the mathematical equations of this theory,
T2 need not also preserve the ontology of T 1. By simply preserving the structural relations of
T1, the theory T2 will also preserve the arity of these relations and can thus preserve the
variables of T1. In this way, the two theories can satisfy a weakened form of condition (1)
above without the need for the retention of ontology: the variables of T 2 that stand in the
same relations to each other as the relations in which the variables in T 2 stand to each other
need not refer to the same entities in T 2 as they did in T1. Condition (2) can similarly be
satisfied without the need for a shared ontology between the theories T 1 and T2: the preserved
variables can be assigned similar values by T 1 and T2 without having to refer to the same
entities in both theories.
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Once again, this retention of structure need not be complete. v If the theory T1 contains
too little structure to accurately represent the structure of the physical world, the theory T 2 can
“preserve” the variables of T1 while including more relations among these variables, as well
as adding more relations between the variables of T 1 and the new variables found only in T 2.
As such, T2 can supplement the deficient formal structure of T 1. If, on the other hand, T1 has
more structure than T2, then a corresponding story can be told. It is possible for T 2 to
eliminate redundant elements of T 1’s formal structure, where these surplus structural elements
might be identified by the discovery of their unnecessary role in generating successful
predictions, lack of heuristic value, etc. In this way, T 2 can pare down the surplus structure of
T1 while preserving the essential structural components of T 1 (where what is “essential” will
presumably be determined by criteria such as causal efficaciousness, for example).
A result of the imperfect preservation of structure between successive scientific theories
is the fact that the Epistemic Structural Realist must limit claims of justification to beliefs
about the approximate accuracy of a scientific theory’s formal structure. Because there is
reason to believe that neither the earlier theory nor its predecessor will have the exact level of
structural detail that perfectly matches the amount of physical structure exhibited by the
world, the Epistemic Structural Realist must settle for a version of the “No Miracles”
Argument that employs the assumption of partial structure preservation between successive
theories. The Epistemic Structural Realist can then argue for the comparatively modest
conclusion that the formal structures of mature scientific theories are approximately accurate
representations of the physical structure present in the world.
V. Idealizations in Scientific Model Construction
How exactly can the structure of an earlier theory be recovered as a limiting case of a
successor theory? Many instances of the limiting case relation between mature (according to
Worrall’s criteria) successive scientific theories involve idealization assumptions. In
discussing the process of model construction in the context of the Semantic View of
theoriesvi, Anjan Chakravartty identifies two processes involved in this construction:
abstraction and idealization (Chakravartty 2007, 190). According to Chakravartty, abstraction
involves ignoring some of the often numerous factors present in a physical system in order to
construct a model that will serve as a simplification of this physical system (Chakravartty
2007, 190). The simplified model only represents some of the factors that are potentially (or
in fact) relevant to the behavior of the physical system, usually for pragmatic reasons. It is
often the case that the number of factors relevant to the behavior of the physical system being
studied is too many to be included in a model of that physical system. Moreover, the relative
significance of these ignored factors is negligible in the particular context in which the
physical system is being studied; the effects of these factors on the predictive accuracy of a
theory may be miniscule at the relevant scale, for example. Abstraction, however, “does not
undermine the idea that putative representations of factors composing abstract models can be
thought to have counterparts in the world. The fact that some factors are ignored is perfectly
consistent with the idea that others are represented” (Chakravartty 2007, 191). The fact that
certain factors are ignored when constructing a model of some physical system does not mean
the relevant model cannot be an approximately accurate representation of the physical system.
Idealization is also often employed when constructing scientific models. Unlike mere
abstraction, however, idealization involves more than simply excluding factors potentially
relevant to the behavior of the physical system being studied: idealization also “[incorporates]
factors that cannot exist as represented given the actual properties and relations involved”
(Chakravartty 2007, 191).vii In other words, idealization employs certain nomologically
impossible assumptions in order to simplify the model being constructed (where this
simplification can be motivated by the pragmatic constraints mentioned above).
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As an example of abstraction and idealization in a scientific model, consider that of a
simple pendulum (Chakravartty 2007, 191). Such a model is usually presented as consisting
of a weight attached to a pivot point by means of rod. Factors such as the air resistance
affecting the motion of the weight or the friction of the rotating pivot are usually excluded
from the model, in accordance with the abstraction process. Notice, however, that there is no
principled reason why such a model that ignores these factors could not be physically
realized. A closed physical system containing no air resistance and no friction is
nomologically possible: i.e., it could be physically realized without violating the actual laws
of nature.
Other elements of the model are simplified beyond what is physically realizable in any
such system, however. Examples are the rod’s total lack of mass in the model, as well as the
representation of the weight as a point-mass: an object whose total mass is concentrated at a
single extension-less point. These types of simplifications (idealizations) could not in
principle be physically realized by any system: a rod pivoting around a point with a weight
attached must have some non-zero mass in any physical system; likewise, the mass of this
weight could not be completely condensed down to a single dimensionless point in any
physical system conforming to the actual laws of nature.
Both abstraction and idealization are often used simultaneously in scientific practice for
the construction of models (Chakravartty 2007, 191). Nevertheless, the distinction
concerning nomological possibility mentioned above will prove to have significant
implications for the epistemic attitudes of the Structural Realist towards the formal structures
of scientific theories.
VI. Limiting Cases as Idealizations
Recall the notion of structural continuity that is at the heart of the Epistemic Structural
Realist’s version of the “No Miracles” Argument. The Epistemic Structural Realist will argue
that there is substantial (even if incomplete) structural continuity between successive mature
scientific theories, which means the formal structures of earlier theories will be viewed as
approximately accurate from the point of view of later (mature) theories. This claim of
approximate structural accuracy, in turn, will be the only acceptable explanation of the
empirical success enjoyed by each of the successive theories and so should be accepted.
Again, the notion of incomplete preservation of structure between successive theories is
understood in terms of limiting cases. Consider the successive theories of classical
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, for example. viii Both theories seem to meet the
criterion of maturity (in Worrall’s sense), since both have enjoyed novel predictive success.
Moreover, the two theories exemplify the limiting case relation with which the Epistemic
Structural Realist explains partial structural continuity. The formal structure of
thermodynamics can be derived from the formal structure of statistical mechanics by taking
the “thermodynamic limit” in the latter: assuming the relevant physical system contains an
infinite number of particles (Batterman 2005, 227). By allowing the number of particles in
the system to tend to infinity, the formal structure of thermodynamics can be recovered from
the formal structure of statistical mechanics.
Notice, however, that this “thermodynamic limit” is an idealization: no system with an
infinite number of particles could be physically realized ix. It follows that the limiting case
relation between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics can only be instantiated by
making use of an idealization (viz., the “thermodynamic limit” assumption). But this means
that the formal structure of the theory of thermodynamics can only be recovered from the
formal structure of statistical mechanics through the use of an assumption that is not merely
(strictly) false, but physically impossible. In other words, the partial retention of formal
structure between these two mature theories in terms of the limiting case relation employs a
nomologically impossible assumption.
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VII. Problems with Employing Idealizations
This use of idealization in the derivation of limiting cases can be found among many
other mature successive scientific theories.x It poses a problem, however, for the Epistemic
Structural Realist’s claim about the approximate structural accuracy of scientific theories.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is partial structural continuity between two
mature successive theories such as thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. The presence
of this partial structural continuity will imply that the two theories exemplify the limiting case
relation, since the partial structural continuity is understood in terms of this limiting case
relation for the Epistemic Structural Realist. So thermodynamics will constitute a limiting
case of statistical mechanics. This, in turn, means that the derivation of the thermodynamic
formal structure from the statistical mechanical formal structure will involve an idealization.
The theory of thermodynamics will thus constitute an idealization of the relevant physical
system by virtue of the role the “thermodynamic limit” (discussed above) plays in deriving
the formal structure of thermodynamics from the formal structure of statistical mechanics.
But if this is the case, then the formal structure of thermodynamics will be rendered not just
inaccurate, strictly speaking; it will constitute a nomologically impossible structure, by virtue
of the use of the “thermodynamic limit” idealization. Given that the structure of
thermodynamics cannot be physically realized, then, in what sense can it be said to be an
approximately accurate representation of the physical structure of the world? To what degree
could a nomologically impossible structure approximate a (the) nomological structure that
actually obtains?
Notice that the Epistemic Structural Realist cannot fall back on an appeal to approximate,
as opposed to strict, accuracy of structure here (as was done in response to Pincock’s
objection above). The problem for the Epistemic Structural Realist is not just that the formal
structure of the thermodynamic theory is strictly false, and therefore disconnected from reality
to some extent.xi The problem is deeper than this: the formal structure of thermodynamics
could not possibly be realized by the structure of the physical system that actually obtains in
our world. The notion of its approximate accuracy in representing the physical structure of
the world is thus rendered a complete mystery. As a result, the Epistemic Structural Realist is
left without a reason to believe in the approximate structural accuracy of thermodynamics.
The nomological impossibility of the thermodynamic theory’s formal structure thus
undermines the motivation for believing in its approximate truth. But if belief in the
approximate accuracy of the thermodynamic structure can no longer be justified, then the
Epistemic Structural Realist is left without an explanation for the empirical success of
science. Without a reason to believe in the approximate accuracy of the thermodynamic
formal structure, the structural continuity obtaining between thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics is no longer enough to mount a structural version of the “No Miracles” argument.
This appears to undermine the entire Epistemic Structural Realist position.
VIII. Potential ESR Reponses and Replies
(1) Appeal to Empirical Success
At this point, the Epistemic Structural Realist might appeal to the empirical success of
thermodynamics in order to argue that the use of idealization assumptions does not undermine
the reasons for believing in the approximate structural accuracy of the theory. Of course, the
mere empirical success of thermodynamics is not enough to ground the realism of the
Epistemic Structural Realist: the latter must give an explanation of this empirical success.
The problem, it seems, is that this explanation will have to take the form of another “No
Miracles” argument: the reason thermodynamics proved so empirically successful is the fact
that its formal structure is an approximately accurate representation of the physical structure
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in the world (Worrall 2007, 143). But it is precisely the approximate structural accuracy of
the theory that is being questioned. So an appeal to empirical success will either not be
enough by itself (since this will not be enough to grant the Epistemic Structural Realist a
“Realist” status), or will presuppose the approximate structural accuracy of the theory that is
at issue.
Other types of explanation seem to be off-limits to the Epistemic Structural Realist
precisely because of the epistemic commitment to structures only. Worrall (2007) notes that
the way in which the formal structure of a theory can successfully represent the physical
structure of the world “cannot be further specified—to suppose that it can would be to
suppose that we can somehow have access to the universe that is not theory-mediated and thus
can directly compare what our theories say with reality”, this last claim being “untenable”
(Worrall 2007, 143). In other words, any explanation that purported to specify exactly how
the formal structure of a theory manages to successfully represent the physical structure of the
world would have to go beyond an epistemic commitment to mere structures xii. But this
would be to go beyond the Epistemic Structural Realist position itself.
(2) Appeal to Alternative Derivations
The Epistemic Structural Realist might also respond by claiming that the above argument
concerning structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics does not
generalize. Even if the structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical
mechanics involves the use of an idealization, it does not follow that all instances of the
limiting relation between mature successive theories will necessarily involve idealization
assumptions. It may be possible to derive the formal structure of an earlier theory from the
formal structure of its successor without the need to invoke nomologically impossible limits.
The formal structure of classical mechanics, for example, may be derived from the formal
structure of relativistic mechanics by allowing the velocity of an object to approach zero
instead of letting the speed of light tend toward infinity. In this way, physically unrealizable
assumptions may be avoided as consequences of partial structural continuity between
successive theories.
The mere possibility of derivations that do not rely on idealization assumptions is not
enough, however. In particular, the above alternative characterization of the limiting case
relation that obtains between classical mechanics and relativistic mechanics does not clarify
the structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, or the sense in
which the structure of the former can be said to be approximately accurate. The successful
avoidance of idealization assumptions in a single case of theory succession, in other words,
does not resolve the mystery of how the formal structure of an earlier theory can be an
idealization of its successor, and yet count as approximately accurate, in many other cases of
paradigm structural continuity between successive mature scientific theories. Similar
alternative derivations of structure that avoided the use of idealizations xiii would have to be
provided for other paradigm cases of structural continuity between successive theories. Until
then, cases such as the transition from thermodynamics to statistical mechanics remain
problematic for the Epistemic Structural Realist’s claim to the approximate structural
accuracy of predecessor theories.
(3) Appeal to Approximation
Finally, the Epistemic Structural Realist can appeal to a distinction between
approximation and idealization (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, §1.1). Though conceptually
similar, approximation can be characterized as divorced from any concerns regarding
nomological possibility. When a mathematical equation is approximated by another equation
by letting some quantity tend toward some limit, “the issue of physical interpretation need not
arise. Unlike [idealization], which involves a distortion of a real system, approximation is a
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purely formal matter” (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, §1.1). In other words, the limiting case
relation that obtains between the formal structure of thermodynamics (for example) and that
of statistical mechanics can be a purely formal (mathematical) relation. This would avoid the
use of problematic idealization assumptions in the derivation of the thermodynamic structure
from the statistical mechanical structure, while preserving some sense in which the former is a
limiting case of the latter (and therefore preserving structural continuity between the two
theories).
But is this sense of “limiting case” robust enough for the Epistemic Structural Realist?
Approximation, as described above, is an entirely formal relation obtaining between the
structures of successive scientific theories. It does not appeal to the relevant physical system
(the system the two theories are presumably studying) in order to derive the formal structure
of the earlier theory from the formal structure of the successor theory. This, again, is in
contrast to a derivation involving idealization assumptions. But appeal to the relevant
physical system seems necessary in securing the continuity of a structure that the Epistemic
Structural Realist can have reason to believe (approximately) corresponds to the structure of
the physical world. Without appealing to the relevant physical system, the derivation of one
formal structure from another reduces to what Newman (2005, 1378) calls “a trivial symbolic
realism”. The Epistemic Structural Realist no longer has reason to believe that the formal
structure being preserved as a limiting case through the use of approximation is appropriately
correlated with the physical system being studied. Strictly formal relations between
structures, after all, are not enough to show that both structures accurately represent (to an
acceptably approximate degree) the physical relations obtaining within the relevant physical
system.xiv Even if the formal structure of statistical mechanics were an approximately
accurate representation of a given physical system, the mere fact that the structure of
thermodynamics was formally related to the structure of statistical mechanics would not
guarantee that the formal structure of thermodynamics was also an approximately accurate
representation of the physical system. xv A more robust relation than mere approximation is
needed in order to secure the structural accuracy of thermodynamics from the fact that there is
structural continuity between the two theories of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.
IX. Additional Implications of Employing Idealizations
The use of idealization assumptions in establishing a limiting case relation between
successive theories undermines the Epistemic Structural Realist’s reasons for believing in the
approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory. This result, however, poses potential
problems for belief in the approximate structural accuracy of successor theories as well.
One possible difficulty for the Epistemic Structural Realist is the inability to justify belief
in the structural accuracy of the successor theory, given that belief in the structural accuracy
of the earlier theory is no longer tenable. The use of idealization assumptions in the
derivation of the earlier theory’s structure from the successor theory’s structure casts doubt on
even the approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory, since these idealization
assumptions imply that the structure of the earlier theory could never be physically realized.
But if belief in the approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory is thus undermined,
what reason does the Epistemic Structural Realist have left to believe in the approximate
structural accuracy of the successor theory? A significant motivation for establishing
structural continuity between successor theories, after all, is to provide justification for the
belief in accumulation of true structural content: justification for the belief that the refinement
of structure leads to an increasingly accurate representation of the physical structure of the
world. If there is reason to doubt the approximate structural accuracy of an earlier theory,
however, then structural continuity will not provide justification for the belief in the
approximate structural accuracy of the successor theory. The earlier theory cannot bequeath
approximate structural accuracy to any successor theories if it does not have this approximate
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structural accuracy in the first place. Consequently, the justification of the Epistemic
Structural Realist for the belief in the structural accuracy of successor theories is also
undermined.
A second possible worry is a version of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, in terms of
idealization. If the structure of thermodynamics is a physically unrealizable idealization of
the structure of statistical mechanics, how can the Epistemic Structural Realist be sure that the
structure of statistical mechanics will not itself be an idealization of some future theory’s
structure? Epistemic Structural Realism, after all, was proposed as a philosophical theory that
respected the occurrence of theory-change in the sciences, and took seriously the likely
possibility that even current scientific theories will (likely) one day be superseded. But if the
theory of statistical mechanics, for example, may one day be shown to be simply a limiting
case of some future theory, then all of the reasons for doubting the approximate structural
accuracy of thermodynamics pose a risk to the Epistemic Structural Realist’s confidence in
the structural accuracy of statistical mechanics as well. Even if there are reasons independent
of structural continuity and the empirical success of science for believing that the structure of
some future theory accurately represents (to some degree) the structure of the physical world
(what would these reasons be?), this does not preclude the possibility that statistical
mechanics itself, the currently more mature scientific theory available (as compared with
thermodynamics), will be shown to have a physically unrealizable structure. Consequently,
the Epistemic Structural Realist is left without reason to believe in the approximate structural
accuracy of any mature scientific theories, whether they have already been superseded or will
one day be supplanted.
X. Conclusion
Epistemic Structural Realism claims there is preservation of formal structure through the
succession of one scientific theory by another. It appeals to this structural continuity in order
to formulate an argument for the structures in mature theories being approximately accurate
representations of the physical structure of the world. The concept of structural continuity is
understood in terms of a limiting case relation obtaining between successive theories. This
limiting case relation, in turn, is often established using idealization assumptions: the structure
of a theory is a limiting case of the structure of its successor theory when the earlier structure
can be derived (recovered) from the successor structure, given certain initial and boundary
conditions.
It is often the case, however, that these initial and boundary conditions are idealizations
of the physical system being studied by both theories. The derivation of an earlier structure
from its successor, therefore, employs nomologically impossible assumptions. This suggests
the earlier structure is itself physically unrealizable, which undermines the claim that it is an
approximately true representation of the structure governing the physical system being
studied. But if the earlier structure can no longer be considered approximately accurate, this
undermines whatever claim to approximate truth the successor structure enjoys: the successor
structure cannot inherit any approximate accuracy from the earlier structure if this earlier
structure has none to bequeath in the first place, after all. This suggests Epistemic Structural
Realism as a whole is undermined, which in turn threatens the justification for a belief in the
accuracy of scientific theories overall.xvi
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i

Worrall defines “mature” scientific theories as those theories that lead to novel empirical
generalizations beyond any empirical consequences that have already been observed.
These generalizations must be shown to generate new and empirically successful
predictions (Worrall 1989, 113-114).
ii
Worrall associates the formal structure of a scientific theory with the mathematical
equations describing the behavior of theoretical entities in a physical system (Worrall
1989, 118-119).
iii
By way of an example, Pincock writes: “We could imagine a competing electromagnetic
theory which ascribed two kinds of charge to particles and had complicated equations
relating these different kinds of charges to each other and to the trajectories of the
relevant particles” (Pincock 2011, 74).
iv
Another example: “Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory ignored these possibilities [of
electromagnetic interactions being affected by intra-particle forces at high energy levels]
and so this parameter [representing the relevant intra-particle forces] did not appear in
that theory. Additional structure is needed to account for phenomena at higher energies,
but we have no hint of this from the experiments conducted in Maxwell’s time” (Pincock
2011, 74).
v
Cf. Worrall (2007, 142-144) for a discussion of partial structural retention.
vi
The Semantic View of theories claims scientific theories should be identified with
collections of models, as opposed to being identified with a linguistic formal axiomatic
system (as the Syntactic View suggests). For further discussion, see Chakravartty (2007,
187-190).
vii
Chakravartty’s distinction between abstraction and idealization roughly corresponds to the
distinction between Aristotelian idealization and Galilean idealization. See Frigg and
Hartmann (2012, §1.1) for further discussion.
viii
Pincock (2011) discusses this example in relation to his objection described above
(Pincock 2011, 77). See also Batterman (2005), whom Pincock cites.
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ix

It is an interesting question whether or not the number of particles in a physical system
could continue to grow infinitely, without ever actually being infinite. Regardless, the
structure of such a system would not be a realization of the structure of thermodynamics,
which would require an infinite number of particles according to statistical mechanics.
x
Famous examples include the conception of (1) Classical Mechanics as a limiting case of
Relativistic Mechanics under the idealization of letting the speed of light tend to infinity
in the formal structure of the latter, and (2) the Ideal Gas Law as a limiting case of certain
thermodynamic equations under the idealization of having an ideal gas composed of point
(dimensionless) particles. Thanks to Marc Alspector-Kelly for bringing these examples
to my attention.
xi
Cf. Mark Newman’s (2005) objection against the Epistemic Structural Realist, in which he
argues that structural “retention through theory change is not sufficient” to establish the
claim that a theory’s formal structure succeeds in accurately representing the physical
structure of the world (Newman 2005, 1377).
xii
This is also the reason why the Epistemic Structural Realist cannot appeal to an ontological
conception of formal structure in order to avoid the issues posed by the use of
idealization assumptions. Cf. Chakravartty (2007, 143-144) for a discussion of how an
ontological conception of the Laws of Nature may avoid the “in-principle vacuity” of
idealized formulations of these Laws.
xiii
It is not clear, however, that replacing a limit towards infinity with a limit towards zero will
always succeed in avoiding idealization: it might also be nomologically impossible for
certain quantities to tend towards zero in a physical system. Recall, for example, the use
of point-particles (whose dimensions tend toward zero), or the rod used in the simple
pendulum model (whose mass tends towards zero).
xiv
This can be the case even when the use of purely formal methods to relate different
structures proves empirically successful. Cf. Johannes Kepler’s successful use of
Platonic solids to model the distance relationships between the six planets known at the
time (Di Liscia 2011, §3). Thanks to Marc Alspector-Kelly for bringing this example to
my attention.
xv
Cf. Pincock’s assertion concerning the considerations motivating preservation of structure:
“If [purely] mathematical concerns are driving things, then there is little reason to believe
the structural claims of the scientific theory” (Pincock 2011, 76).
xvi
I would like to thank Marc Alspector-Kelly, Matthew Minton Miller, and Dustin Van Pelt
for a number of helpful discussions on the topics of this paper.
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